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Helen Graham 
 
Oral History, ‘Learning Disability’ and Pedagogies of Self 
(Oral History, 37(1), 85-94). 
 
Abstract 
Oral history interviews are one form in a wider and changing formation of individualisation, 
personalisation and self-representation – a formation which is politically volatile. This article 
explores this volatility through one interview conducted as part of the Heritage Lottery Funded 
„History of Day Centres for People with Learning Disabilities‟ project. In his interview Tom Brown 
mobilises the idea of „free will‟ to account for changes in his life – an account which both 
contradicts and challenges the professional assessment procedures and eligibility criteria which 
are likely to have determined his life course. To help explore the complexities of his account, the 
article traces the multiple histories of the interview showing the specific meanings of Tom‟s 
claim to „free will‟. The article concludes by arguing that the oral history interview needs to avoid 
simply becoming a „pedagogy of self‟ used to support the production of a model personhood 
defined by „independence‟ and „choice‟.1 Instead oral history practice needs to retain its critical 
edge by specifically understanding the models of personhood being articulated through oral 
histories as not simply reflecting the past and present but creating the future.  
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Oral History, ‘Learning Disability’ and Pedagogies of Self  
 
It was a hot day in early summer when Tom and I climbed the stairs and found a room on the 
first floor. In the recording of the interview the silence between our voices is only occasionally 
punctuated by the buzzing of a fridge, the distant growl of a lawn mower or a scream of laughter 
from downstairs. None of this detail is mere scene setting: the very fact we were able to conduct 
an uninterrupted interview is an expression of substantial change in Tom‟s life. Tom is eligible to 
attend one of Croydon Social Services‟ Resource Bases – where we conducted the interview – 
because he is classified as having a learning disability. I only came to know Tom because the 
large day centres Tom used to attend have been closed or re-focused following shifts in 
professional thinking and government policy. More specifically, I was also only able to be there 
to interview Tom because the Heritage Lottery Fund agreed that people‟s memories of 
Croydon‟s day centres were worth exploring. This article explores the general significance of the 
oral history interview within the confluence of changes which made this particular interview 
possible. 
 
Tom began his time using Croydon learning disability day services by attending what was then 
called, „Waylands Craftwork, Training and Social Centre‟ in the 1970s [Photo 1]. He then moved 
to „Cherry Orchard Advanced Adult Training Centre‟ [Photo 2] and now splits his week between 
a job and attending the Resource Base. I want to enter our interview at a point where we had 
already talked about his role doing „industrial work‟, specifically working in Waylands laundry 
which took in washing from the council‟s old people‟s homes and where he used „the washing 
machines and the spin dryer‟ [Photo 3]: 
H Do you know why it was you that you erm, stopped going to Waylands and 
started going to Cherry Orchard? 
T  Don‟t know. 
H  Not sure? 
T Well, I thought . . . the time it came for me to leave I had been there, I‟d been 
there twenty seven years. 
H  Really? 
T  Twenty seven years on the same job. Bit much isn‟t it? (Laughs) 
H  Yes. So twenty seven years in the laundry? 
T  That was the time I thought, right I‟m stopping . . . so that‟s when I left. 
H  So you were kind of erm given the option to  leave to go to Cherry Orchard? 
T  No.  
H  Um. 
T  No, I left of my own free will. (Laughs) 
H  Yeah, of course, yeah.  
[. . . ] 
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T Then I went to Waylands to the laundry, then I left there. I have been in Cherry 
Orchard for twenty seven years I thought well, I can‟t stand it any more I have 
had enough. (Laughs) I‟d had enough after twenty seven years. 
H  Yeah, sure. What about when you sort of . .  . left? 
T  I left and came here [the Resource Base].2 
 
This extract indexes a range of different histories. Most obviously Tom‟s account speaks to how 
learning disability policy and professional practice has developed over the past forty years. His 
account of his life also references the history of self-advocacy for people with learning 
disabilities, where people have come to speak for themselves and emphasise „nothing about us 
without us‟. Implied here too is the history of oral history itself – both as a methodology for 
listening to individuals and groups ignored by mainstream history production and as a tool for 
working with people with learning disabilities specifically. Lurking in less tangible ways within the 
interview‟s conditions of possibility is New Labour social policy, specifically logics of 
„independence‟ and „choice‟ which have defined recent learning disability white papers and the 
creation of the Heritage Lottery Fund with its aim of „giving voice‟ as a means of realising social 
„inclusion‟.  
 
What links all these indexed strands is a formation: a growing shift in numerous social domains 
towards individualisation, personalisation and self-representation. Thinking of these apparently 
differently located histories and debates through the notion of a formation allows us to see the 
politically volatile nature of any oral history interview. Of course this volatility has long been 
noted by oral historians, not least in Paul Thompson‟s recognition that oral history had to be 
conducted with a certain „spirit‟ in order to avoid „confirm[ing]‟ rather than changing the world.3 It 
was noted too by Luisa Passerini in her warning that oral history should strive for „critical 
consciousness‟ rather than „mere populism‟.4 More recently, numerous voices – including 
Alistair Thomson – have argued for community oral history to remain critically engaged and for 
efforts to be made to ensure connections are made between the local, the national and the 
global.5 All of these writers evoke in different ways a sense that the specificity of any given 
articulation must be noted but not fetish-ised as unique. Each writer emphasises too the political 
necessity of generating critical engagement with the people, things and ideas which impact on 
interviewees‟ lives.  
 
Indeed, at the heart of the negotiations between Tom and I throughout the extract above is the 
old sociological chestnut of the relative significance of people‟s individual agency in shaping 
their life („free will‟ as Tom put it) versus structural determinants such as race, economic 
inequality or, in this case, Croydon Social Services‟ interpretation of ability and eligibility for 
specific services. This agency/structure debate has taken a particular form in the oral history 
literature through a focus on the significance of individual memory. Anna Green has called into 
question the ways in which some work has searched primarily for structural determinants, 
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arguing that „historians are increasingly focused upon the ways in which individual recollections 
fit (often unconscious) cultural scripts or templates‟ and arguing instead for a re-assertion of „the 
value of individual remembering, and the capacity of the conscious self to contest and critique 
cultural scripts or discourses‟.6 
 
Tom‟s interview – with his strong account of „free will‟ – seems a significant site to use in 
revisiting the relationship between „individual remembering‟/„agency‟ and „cultural 
scripts‟/„structural determinants‟. My aim here is to develop a history of our interview, through 
tracing its place within the histories of oral history, of learning disability policy and practice and 
of learning disability day services in Croydon. The purpose of this is to materially and politically 
locate the significance of Tom‟s account of agency. This in turn will help us understand better 
how this account came to be possible but also what such an account puts at stake within a 
shifting policy context of tightening eligibility criteria for services and New Labour reassertions of 
meritocracy. Finally I will conclude by drawing out the implications of this specific analysis for 
oral history practice today. 
 
Oral History and Agency/Structure  
Oral history has always been uneasily located within the agency/structure debate. Through not 
always referred to using this sociological language, the relative importance of the individual as 
autonomous and capable of voluntary action and articulations versus structural forces, which 
determine, organise and limit individuals‟ agency is a key feature of the oral history literature. 
Many social theorists have critiqued the agency/structure polerisation, attempting to find a 
conceptual framework for seeing the „individual‟ and „society‟ as mutually constitutive and in 
dynamic interrelationship. Perhaps the most influential of these theoretical reworkings is Nobert 
Elias‟ The Civilising Process, which historically accounts for the agency/structure polerisation.  
Elias argues that the conceptual divide between „individuals‟ and „society‟ has precisely enabled 
the development of the modern individual. He terms this modern individual „homo clauses’ 
which he sees as a particular model of humanity-as-agent whose „core, his being, his true self 
appears likewise as something divided within him by an invisible wall from everything outside, 
including every other human being‟. Elias breaches the agency/structure divide through the idea 
of „figurations‟ which emphasize „individual‟ and „society‟ as mutually producing:  
The concept of the figuration has been introduced precisely because it expresses what we 
call „society‟ more clearly and unambiguously than the existing conceptual tools of 
sociology, as neither an abstraction of attributes of individuals existing without a society, 
nor a „system‟ or „totality‟ beyond individuals, but the network or interdependencies formed 
by individuals.7   
 
There are two significant insights here for oral history. The first is that the conceptualisation of 
the individual as agent – homo clauses – is a historically-produced phenomena and that this 
model of individuality was in no way inevitable. The second is that what we call „agency‟ – be 
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that a specific action or a specific articulation in an oral history interview – is actively enabled by 
a range of past and present „pluralities‟. In short, an individual‟s memories shared through an 
oral history interview encounter are neither the product of the unique mind of an autonomous 
individual nor are they fully determined by cultural scripts or social structures. Rather they are 
co-produced through the figurations that have made up a person‟s life and the specific figuration 
of two people recording their conversation in a room.  
 
The interview: pasts  
While homo clauses is an historically-produced phenomenon which needs to be accounted for 
generally, this is more starkly true for people who have been classified as „having a learning 
disability‟. The status of „agent‟ has not been equally conferred and at different times Caucasian 
women, children and disabled people and non-Caucasian peoples have all been actively 
exempted from this model of personhood. In fact, as I will go on to show, the figurations that led 
to Tom and I speaking – and his mobilisation of agency as a way of explaining his life – have 
been more deliberately and consciously-produced by policy and social care professionals 
precisely because of that sense of previous exclusion.  
 
The interview I conducted with Tom did have has a strong policy context. In 2001 the Valuing 
People: A New Strategy for Learning Disability for the 21st Century White Paper set out its 
vision: specifically segregated „community care‟ services such day centres and residential 
homes would be replaced by more flexible person-centred and individually-tailored support 
which would be guided by core values of „independence‟, „choice‟, „rights‟ and „inclusion‟.8 Since 
2001, Valuing People has been supplemented and extended by Improving the Life Chances of 
Disabled People which offered a „focus on independent living‟, Our Health, Our Care, Our Say, 
which reiterated governmental commitment to „individualised budgets‟ – which would allow 
people to buy in their own assistance services – and most recently Valuing People Now: From 
Progress to Transition. Each document emphasises the same core values and sees 
personalisation as a means of transforming the ways learning disability services have been 
conceived as means of „improving‟ the lives of people with learning disabilities.9 
 
These changes in learning disability day services can be tracked through shifting models of 
power. The „training centres‟ of the late-60s and 70s mobilised what Michel Foucault has 
described as „disciplinary‟ means – such as repetition of work, clocking in machines, bells and 
buzzers for lunch and tea-time, regimes of personal care and regulation of behaviour such as 
shouting. However, subsequent changes and certainly post-Valuing People services have 
tended to use techniques of what Foucault characterised as „liberal government‟, which 
highlights the ways through which individuals come to govern and control themselves.10 In their 
work on New Labour‟s creation of a „citizen-consumer‟ John Clarke, Janet Newman, Nick Smith, 
Elizabeth Vidler and Louise Westmarland have argued that, when seen through a Foucauldian 
lens, „the consumer‟ marks „the shift . . . to neo- or advanced liberal governmentality‟ and is „an 
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embodiment of the self-managing subject governed “at a distance”‟.11 In Croydon‟s learning 
disability services a range of techniques have been deployed to support people to become 
increasingly self-managing. In the 1990s the time and space of Waylands was gradually 
relaxed. The highly regulated industrial work in workshops were transformed into new spaces – 
such as a café and social club – where people were encouraged to exercise more choice over 
how to spend time. In other words, certain material shifts of space and time were deployed to 
move people from being subject to others [Instructors, the bell, the clocking-in machine] to 
becoming subject to themselves and becoming the autonomous, choice-making individuals 
evoked in the Valuing People White Paper.  
 
Nikolas Rose, whose work on the history of psychology has been influenced by Foucault‟s work 
on governmentality, has linked techniques or technologies of subjectification to the rise of 
„psychology‟, which he sees as an „intellectual technology‟ aimed precisely at facilitating the 
more indirect range of „acting upon actions‟: 
The significance of psychology, here, is the elaboration of a know-how of this autonomous 
individual, striving for self-realisation. Psychology has thus participated in reshaping the 
practices of those who exercise authority over others – social workers, managers, 
teachers, nurses – such that they nurture and direct those individual strivings in the most 
appropriate and productive fashions. It has invented what one might term the therapies of 
normality or the psychologies of everyday life, the pedagogies of self-fulfilment 
disseminated through the mass media, which translate the enigmatic desires and 
dissatisfaction of the individual into precise ways of inspecting oneself, accounting for 
oneself, and working upon oneself in order to realise one‟s potential, gain happiness and 
exercise one‟s autonomy.12 
 
In the context of changing day services, „pedagogies of self-fulfilment‟ and „therapies of 
normality‟ include smaller rooms/ café-style seating at the Resource Bases; the use of a white 
board to help people make choices between activities offered; equipment for making your own 
tea/coffee rather than waiting for „tea-time‟ and the tea urn; travel training, so people can travel 
on their own to particular places. These techniques have been brought together in learning 
disability services UK-wide through „person-centred planning‟ which is used to enable people to 
identify targets for choice and self-realisation across domains including friends, food and drink, 
holidays and work and is underpinned by the principle that the „[learning disabled] person is 
central and in control‟ and that the process of person-centred planning should set „no limits to 
the person‟s wants, needs and dreams for their life‟.13  
 
In these ways, learning disability day services have been reconfigured to enable self-
expression. But there are, however, histories at play here other than policy and professional 
desires to „act on‟ learning disabled people‟s actions. Where self-expression can be seen as a 
„pedagogy‟ to support the development of the „self-managing self‟, self-expression was also core 
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to the liberation movements of the late-1960s, 1970s and 1980s. For example, the Women‟s 
Liberation Movement included active re-thinking of individualised models of personhood.14 While 
in terms of improving social care services, self-advocacy has been connected to the individual 
being able to express their own needs, self-advocacy has also been situated as a liberation 
movement where individual self-expression is core to a developing collective understanding and 
analysis of society. In this vein, Ken Simons has characterised self-advocacy as „a process of 
individual development through which a person comes to have the confidence and ability to 
express his or her own feelings and wishes . . . [and] . . . a process by which groups of people 
get together and give voice to their common concerns‟.15 Dorothy Atkinson has also 
emphasised this point, arguing that oral history has been used as a basis for a „resistance 
movement‟, creating a range of opportunities for people to be able to articulate their needs, 
challenge service-providers and find out about their rights.16  
 
Another history at play in the interview with Tom is the new funding to support the production of 
„heritage‟. Since its inception the HLF has spent over £49 million on oral history projects alone, 
seeing oral history as giving a „voice‟ and creating „a legacy‟.17  The HLF sees self-expression 
as a key stepping stone to wider social aims. Recent research on its social impact has 
emphasised connections between „giving voice‟ and self-confidence and makes a link between 
individual skill development, changes in attitudes and behaviour and social cohesion („building 
stronger links within and between communities‟) and social inclusion (breaking down barriers to 
access for disadvantaged groups/individuals‟).18  
 
As these multiple histories suggest, self-expression is imbued with a range of significances: as a 
way of generating increasing self-government, as a site through which heritage can create wider 
„social‟ benefit and as a core component in the development of a collective, liberatory analysis 
of society. In these ways, oral history entered Tom‟s life at a time when a number of material 
and conceptual configurations had been actively mobilised to support his self-expression and 
these are the set of histories which must be fully taken into account in approaching an analysis.  
 
The interview: present 
These figurations of learning disability policy and professional practice, use of oral history in 
self-advocacy and the HLF‟s emphasis on „giving voice‟ as a means of social inclusion are the 
conditions of possibility of the interview with Tom. Indeed, the specific encounter between us, 
extracted above, illustrates these figurations and helps see how an expression of „free will‟ was 
produced.  A careful reading of the extract shows that it took a range of negotiations for Tom to 
reach the point of declaring his „free will‟. Tom only claimed it was „free will‟ that led to his 
movement between day centres as my questions became increasingly – through subtly – 
questioning of his agency.  
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I asked the question „why‟ he had left Waylands for Cherry Orchard because, of course, I had 
been told by others that Waylands and Cherry Orchard were configured in a hierarchical 
relationship. That is, a range of assessments of him by members of staff are likely to have 
preceded his movement. Initially Tom seemed unsure about how to account for this change, 
saying „not sure‟. It is after taking some time that he moved from „not sure‟ – not knowing – to a 
passive sentence construction which avoids assigning agency – „time it came for me to leave‟. 
The passive sentence seems to point to a residual sense that there were some sort of 
influences which shaped his life but no-one specific is evoked and the phrase also evokes a 
kind of sense of the inevitability of change.  
 
It is only after I used the phrase „gave you the option‟ that he found an account which more 
obviously links to the increasingly dominant discourse of „independence‟ and „choice‟ and which 
successfully casts him as the agent who has „had enough‟ and wants to move on. The way I 
framed the question was pretty coy. „Gave you the option‟, serves to hide all the assessments 
both formal and informal which are likely to have underpinned these changes in Tom‟s life with a 
phrase which both suggests possibility (that Tom could choose) and limitation (that someone 
externally offers choice). The question, on reflection, does seem to tread pretty lightly through 
this territory and introduces limitation only in a subtle way. However, Tom picked up the 
implication of limitation and thought carefully about this – there was a pause of 2/3 seconds – 
and then clearly interpreted „given the choice‟ as erasing his „free will‟. That moment was pretty 
difficult, his voice was slightly reproachful and he makes it clear he disagreed with the 
implication of my question.  
 
My response to Tom‟s assertion of „free will‟ was „yeah, of course, yeah‟. On the recording my 
voice sounds slightly stressed and the tone of my voice signals the impossibility of reconciling 
all that I knew about assessment procedures which determined movement between the centres 
with what felt respectful to Tom. I think I handled this so awkwardly because in that moment it 
felt specifically disrespectful to introduce a sense of (structural) limitation into my conversations 
with Tom. „Respect‟ is core to „person-centred planning‟ which operates with the ethos that 
„staff‟ should set „no limits to the person‟s wants, needs and dreams for their life‟ and there are 
obvious reasons – given that previous services have operated using control and disciplinary 
means – why such a statement is being used to define new models of professional interaction 
with learning disabled people. However, we should also note that „respect‟ as a mode of relating 
to other people is defined by „deference‟ and „the avoidance of . . . degrading, insulting . . .or 
offending‟. Obviously „respect‟ can be understood as operating on broad scale. At one extreme 
„respect‟ requires that people are not physically abused and verbally insulted. However, the 
other, much more subtle, end of the range – as is suggested in the word „deference‟ – is 
connected to not questioning or challenging people‟s views or, perhaps, their account of 
themselves.19   
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The moment of Tom‟s claim to „free will‟ seems very important precisely because it highlights 
the volatile meaning and significance of any claim to autonomous personhood. There is a strong 
trajectory of self-advocacy which would value Tom‟s claim as a liberatory moment of self-
expression and in some ways it was. After all for him to see it as his right to make choices over 
how he spends his days would have been very challenging to the operation of the day centres in 
the 70s and early 80s. But to take this claim fully on its own terms, limits the possibility for the 
collective analysis and action which Simons evokes as the second strand of self-advocacy. 
Moreover, allowing this claim to simply stand erases the figurations that made it possible and 
the inequalities – in terms of access to resources and „opportunities‟ – which have defined 
Tom‟s life. There is an ethical and political dimension needed in analysing Tom‟s interview 
which exceeds the demands for complete and full „respect‟.  
 
The interview: future  
While figurations have pasts and a present, they also have futures. The oral history interview is 
not simply made up of a range of existing interdependencies but actively makes some futures 
more, and others less, likely. Tom‟s claim to free will and autonomy does not simply reflect 
changing service contexts and wider cultural shifts, it also contributes a conceptual shift which is 
mobilising the model of the self-managing individual to limit and re-distribute social care funding.  
 
What is at stake in the ‘Valuing People’ model of personhood is partially revealed by the news 
released by the Learning Disability Coalition that 73% of councils by the end of the financial 
year 2007/2008 plan only to fund those defined as having critical needs.20 Clarke et al. argue 
that the post-1997 UK government has never represented one coherent political philosophy, 
rather it has been made up of a complex and competing range of ideas and practices which 
include „pro-market, anti-poverty, individualistic, communitarian and managerialist tendencies, to 
say nothing of their peculiar compound of modernising social liberalism and traditional 
social/moral authoritarianism‟.21 Clarke et al. note that „choice‟ has shifted in its meaning since 
1997: 
Overall, we think there was a move from an early New Labour conception of choice as 
meaning choice in ways of assessing or engaging with public services (e.g. by telephone, 
in person or through electronic means …) to a more „marketised‟ sense of people making 
choices between multiple or competing providers and about the content or substance of 
the service they receive.22  
  
In many ways Tom‟s new experience of day services is underpinned by Croydon‟s adoption of 
this earlier model of choice. Services have been reconfigured – often in spite of specific 
resistance by some people using the service – in order to enable people to have more influence 
over how they spend their days. Indeed the changes had been on the cards in Croydon long 
before 1997, and long before the 2001 and the Valuing People White Paper.23  This „softer 
choice‟ is a „pedagogy of self‟ via, what Rose would call, „therapies of normality‟ (going to real 
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shops, rather than buying sweets at a day centre shop, making yourself a cup of tea when you 
like, rather than waiting for the urn to come round).  
 
Increasingly, however, this earlier understanding of choice is becoming increasingly indexed 
with the later model of choice identified by Clarke et al. and „Direct Payments‟ and 
„Individualised Budgets‟, which allow people to employ their own personal assistance, have 
been mobilised as consumer-based marketisation devices. These volatile meanings of „choice‟ 
are not accidental, as Jan Glasby and Rosemary Littlechild argue: 
[. . .] when we talk about the introduction and expansion of direct payments, we are really 
talking about two different processes – on the one hand, a victory for disabled 
campaigners who advocated greater choice and control for disabled people (a civil rights 
or social justice approach); on the other, an attempt by a Conservative government to 
introduce the values of the market into social care and reduce welfare expenditure (a neo-
liberal or market approach).24  
 
Because of this there is, of course, also potentially a rhetorical conflict between arguing for 
better funding and declaring the values of „independence‟ and „choice‟. As Val Williams and 
Andrew Holman note, „Paradoxically [ . . .] people with learning difficulties can literally work their 
way out of eligibility for a service, since the basis for their need for support is to do with lack of 
independence, autonomy and the ability to manage their life‟.25 Linking this analysis with recent 
shifts in eligibility for Incapacity Benefit under the new Employment and Support Allowance and 
the notion that every unemployed council tenant must be looking for work, and it is clear that the 
„socially liberal‟ underpinnings of „softer choice‟ are likely to be fully connected into the „moral 
authoritarianism‟ Clarke et al. identify as one element in New Labour‟s polysemic enterprise.26 
This disciplinary tough talk is always waiting for any individual who does not fully accept 
techniques of self-government.  
 
Rose‟s work on psychology and personhood is underpinned by what he calls „an unease‟: he 
writes „a sense that while our culture accords humans all sorts of capacities and endows all 
sorts of rights and privileges, it also divides, imposes burdens, and thrives upon the anxieties 
and disappointments generated by its own promises‟.27 The powerful discourse of 
„independence‟, „choice‟, „rights‟ and „inclusion‟ doesn‟t seem to recognise the dangers of 
accepting this model of personhood, a model of personhood which is problematic not least 
because it is a yardstick which has been used in the past precisely to judge and classify those 
literally not „measuring up‟. It must be noted that at the same time that Valuing People calls for 
„independence‟, „choice‟, „rights‟ and „inclusion‟ – other government social policy is underpinned 
by a belief in „social mobility‟ underpinned by „meritocracy‟.28 So the same „society‟ into which 
people defined as have learning disabilities are supposed to become included, is one where 
differentiation of capacity is an ongoing and perhaps intensifying concern (one example of this 
would be the concern over how to distinguish between students getting „A‟ grades at A Level). 
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This wider and specific social policy context of „meritocracy‟ can be articulated with the source 
of Rose‟s „unease‟: that the individual of „independence‟ and „choice‟ is also one who has 
increased responsibility for their own ability to realise hopes and dreams - a position supported 
by the increasing invisibility of any analysis which would understand there being any social and 
economic limitations on individual agency. Moreover, as the power of the intentional individual 
with „a unique biography‟ becomes a more stark „horizon‟, the possibility of articulating the 
personal within a collective framework – which has defined some self-advocacy practices – also 
becomes harder.29 In these contexts, oral history practice must take into account that it is 
through models of the individual that future uses of public money and justifications for inequality 
are being configured.  
 
Conclusions 
I wanted to write this article because I needed to understand better the significance of Tom‟s 
claim to „free will‟ and my response – „yeah, of course, yeah‟. Tom made a clear claim to 
autonomy that he required me to respect. His demand for respect is highly compelling precisely 
because of the histories of people defined as „having a learning disability‟ which include 
institutionalisation, segregation and lack of recognition of the individual as having autonomy or 
rights. I think there is a way – through tracing these histories – to value why Tom felt that was 
important. However, ignoring the other historical figurations which made our interview and his 
claim possible would be to make oral history complicit in the production of a model of 
personhood which does not benefit everyone equally. The implications of this model of 
autonomous individuality going unchallenged and unproblematisied are likely to be reduced 
possibilities for a collective political analysis and reduction of resource redistribution to those 
who find it harder to thrive in the employment market as well as, in Rose‟s terms, the imposition 
of increasing burdens of responsibility and culpability. 
 
Oral history has often approached its radical and collective political purpose through individual 
remembering. There is no inherent contradiction here but in a context where the formation of 
self-expression is becoming increasingly coupled with consumer capitalism and marketisation of 
previously publicly held resources and services, a renewed commitment to a critical oral history 
practice is necessary. Most helpful in this is not to see „individuals‟ and „society‟ as separate but 
as fully mutually producing. This makes listening to Tom‟s individual memories of immense 
significance and wiping out that particularity through notions of „cultural scripts‟ is deeply 
unhelpful. But neither can the individual be simply hailed as fully autonomous, erasing the 
complex interdependencies which produce us all as people. A renewed commitment to a critical 
oral history practice would continue to work with the „unease‟ that founded oral history, the 
concern that worried about „populism‟ or the „spirit‟ in which oral history was conducted. But it 
would add to this the unease that Rose expresses. This will help us see our oral histories not 
simply as domains which reflect the past but which – through the models of personhood being 
articulated through oral history – are helping to create the future.  
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